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The issue of large shareholders’ control has become a hot issue of theoretical and 
empirical study of corporate finance. The phenomena of large shareholders’ control 
are found both in developed countries and developing countries. In China, the 
problem is even more severe.  
In countries lack law protection for investors’ interest, large shareholders or the 
concentration of ownership may plays a substitutable protection mechanism in 
corporate governance. We are interested in the role of large shareholders during the 
global financial crisis. 
This research use a sample of Chinese listed companies in related industries to 
test the relationship between buy-and-hold return during the crisis period and large 
shareholders’ control or ultra control right. After control variables such as Beta, P/B 
ratio, leverage and firm size, the proportion of large shareholders’ control and ultra 
control right have significant relation with buy-and-hold return during the crisis 
period. Generally speaking, companies with higher proportion of large shareholders’ 
control performance better, which indicates that large shareholders play a positive role 
in corporate governance during financial crisis.  
This paper includes six sections: 
Section 1 give an outline which covers the following areas: research subject, 
research aim, contents and framework. 
Section 2 provides a review of literature on this subject home and abroad. 
Section 3 introduces the research background—the global financial crisis. 
Section 4 describes crisis period, the data and the definitions of appropriate 
variables and the test model. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. 
Section 6 makes a conclusions and Lpoints out the limitations and future 
direction of this study and puts forwards some suggestions. 
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2. 文献综述 
2.1 大股东控制的普遍性 











Shleifer 和 Vishny(1986)[3] 以《财富》500 强公司中的 456 家公司为对象进行
了研究，发现其中 354 家公司有至少一名股东的拥有比例不低于 5%的公司股权。
456 家公司的 大股东平均持股比例为 15.4%，前五大股东持股比例之和为
28.8%。Holderness 和 Sheehan(1988)[4] 发现在美国公开上市的公司中，几百家
（5%）公司有持股比例在 51%以上的主要股东。La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer 和 Vishny(1998)[5] 对 49 个国家中 大的 10 家非金融、国内完全私有的
上市公司的股权集中度的横向研究表明，除英国和美国等少数几个对小股东保护
较好的国家外，大部分发达国家(如德国、意大利、芬兰和瑞典等)的公司股权都
                                                        
[2] Berle, A, and Means, G, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan, New 
York 
[3] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of 
Political Economy 94, 461-488. 
[4] Holderness, Clifford, G., and Dennis, P., Sheehan, 1988, The role of majority shareholders in  
publicly held corporation: An exploratory analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 
317-346 
[5] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, 
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集中在控股股东手中，特别是在法律不健全的国家企业的大股东控制现象尤为严
重，前三大股东持股比例平均为 46%(中位数为 45%)，其中 高的为希腊，达到
67%。这些公司中， 大三个股东持股比例的均值超过 50%的国家有 22 个之多，
占样本国家数的 48.9%；这些国家中 大三个股东持股比例的均值为 46%。英美
两国的股权结构也比一般认识的要高， 大三个股东持股比例的均值美国为
20%，英国为 19%。 
La Porta 等(1999)[6]采用深入追溯公司 终控制权[7]的方法，进一步对全球







Faccio and Lang(2002)[8]考察了西欧 13 个国家 5232 家公司，发现分散持股在
英国和爱尔兰比较广泛，而欧洲大陆国家公司的股权普遍较为集中，金融机构和
大公司更多是分散控制，非金融企业和小公司多是家族控制。其中 4806 家公司
中至少有一个股东拥有超过 5%的投票权，约占全部公司的 92%；3300 家公司有
至少一名股东其投票权超过 20%，约占全部公司的 63%。 
在新兴市场国家中，所有权集中度比成熟市场更高。在拉丁美洲、东亚和非
洲等地区，大股东控制现象十分广泛(La Porta et 等，1998，1999)。Claessens 等
(2000)[9] 研究了东亚 9 国 2980 家公司的所有权和控制权分离状况，除日本公司
所有权相对集中外，超过三分之二的企业存在单一大股东控制，40%以上的上市
                                                        
[6] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership 
around the world, Journal of Finance 54, 471-517. 
 [7] La Porta 等(1999)提出了 终控制权的概念，他们追踪公司所有权结构，对于直接或间接
属于同一股东的投票权进行加总，从而找出拥有 大投票权的股东，若其投票权超过一
定界限，即界定为 终控制者。 
[8] Faccio,M. and Lang,L.,2002, The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J]. 
Journal of Financial Economics 65,365-395. 
[9] Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, The separation of ownership and  
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